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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the optimal design of a set of legislative rules which 
balances credibility in monetary policy when the central banker has sorne 
private information. The main result is that the best legislative package should 
include a monetary target set by Congress, a targeting horizon consisting of 
one period of time and a small punishment on the central banker if it deviates 
from the target. Moreover, it is shown that both the discretionary and the 
average targeting approaches to monetary policy are nested into our more 
comprehensive approach. 
RESUMEN 
Este artículo examina el diseño óptimo de un paquete legislativo que equilibre 
credibilidad y flexibilidad en la política monetaria cuando el banco central 
dispone de información privada. El principal resultado es que tal paquete 
debería incluir un objetivo monetario fijado por el poder legislativo, un 
anuncio del objetivo para un único periodo de tiempo y una pequeña 
penalización sobre el banco central si se desvía del objetivo. Además, se 
muestra que nuestro enfoque engloba tanto políticas monetarias discrecionales 
como políticas basadas en objetivos medios. 
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The classic tlme-inconslstency problem in monetary pollcy arises when the 
market-determined output leve! is deemed suboptimal by a discretionary central 
banker. As a consequence, its attempt to surprise rational and forward-looklng 
agents with high inflation will cause the economy to sUffer from an 
inflationary bias wi lhout any addi tional gain in output (Finn Kydland and 
Edward Prescott, 1977; Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, 1983b). 
Although solutions to this problem have been proposed via reputation 
(Barro and Gordon, 1983a) or delegation (Kenneth Rogoff, 1985) mechanisms, 
such proposals are weakened if the central banker has sorne prívate information 
because the agents cannot verify that ·the monetary authority has not 
intentionally lnvalidated their expectations (Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1985). 
As alternative resolutions, three legislative approaches have been 
suggested. First, Canzoneri's (1985) average targeting procedure specifies 
that Congress should pass legislation requiring that the average money growth 
rate over a given time horizon equal the desired inflation rate. Second, 
Rogoff's (1985) flexible targeting procedure suggests that Congress should 
impose a cost on the central banker if money growth deviates each perlad from 
the desired inflation rate, Third, Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini's 
(1993} approach suggests that Congress and the central banker should sign a 
performance-based contract specifying a linear punlshment on the central 
banker far any percentage polnt of realized inflation (or money growth). Since 
these procedures do not depend on the central banker' s private information, 
they are operational. 
This paper examines the optima! design of a monetary policy set of 
legislative rules which balances credibility and flexibility in monetary 
policy when there is private information. In particular, we analyze a 
legislated monetary policy package conslsting of a monetary target, a 
punishment for deviation from the target, a targeting horizon, and a target 
setter. The main result of the model is that the best package should lnclude a 
target set by Congress, a targeting horizon consisting of just one period of 
time and a small punishment on the central banker if it deviates from the 
target, Moreover, it is shown that both the discretionary solution and the 
average targeting solution are special cases of our more comprehensive 
approach. 
I. The basic model 
Consider a standard rational expectatlons supply function 
(1) Yt • > o 
where Yt is the log of output in period t, Yn denotes the log of the natural 
rate of output, Jrt is the actual inflation rate in t, and tt~ is the wage 
setters' prediction of the inflation rate conditional on information available 
at the end of period t-1. 
Equation (1} incorporales the basic properties of an ex:pectational 
Phillips curve in which only unexpected inflalion creales, Íor a time, a 
deviation from the natural rate OÍ output. This may due to the existence in 
the economy OÍ nominal labor contracts, Íirms that hire workers according to 
their marginal productivity curve, and sorne labor market imperfections that 
keep real wages above the real market-clearing wage (see Alex Cukierman, 1992, 
pp. 38-42, for details). 
The price level arises from a simple quantity equation 
(2) Pt 
where mt and Pt are the logs of the money stock and the price level, 
respectively, and vt is a money demand disturbance realized at the end of 
period t. Suppose that Vt 
where &t5!-(vt-vt_1 ) and gt is the growth rate of the money stock and the 
monetary pollcymaker's instrument¡ 3t is a white noise innovation in the money 
2 demand with a finite variance, v6. 
After perlod-t wages are set, the monetary policymaker chooses its 
policy, 8t· Suppose further that the wage setters do not see c'it at the time 
they have to specify nominal wages. However, the monetary policymaker does 
have a private forecast (et) of Ot at the time it conducts monetary pollcy. 
such a forecast has a white noise error (et) with finite variance (CT~) and 
2 CT0 . Although the wage 
setters observe c'it and 1It after gt is set, they cannot distinguish the 
forecast, et, from the forecast error, et. 
In our economy there exists a government that carries out certain 
administrative and legisla ti ve duties. Since one of the government' s 
administrative duties is to conduct monetary policy, we will refer to the 
branch of goverrunent that performs administrative tasks as the central banker. 
1be branch of government that carries out legislative duties will be referred 
as Congress, 
We assume that the government as a whole has preferences over two pollcy 
outcomes: a desirable output goal, kyn• and a desirable inflation rate, tt•, as 
reflected in the utility function 
(4) k > 1 
Assume that the government wants to maximlze its expected N-period 
average utility 
(5) ü 1 
= ¡¡ Eo 1 :!O N < (XI 
N is the number of periods in the time horizon contemplated by the 
government, whereas E.r is an expectations operator conditional on period t = T 
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information. Discounting ls lgnored for parslmony. 
The government's expected average N-period utlllty can be rewrltten as 
(6) 
Thus the central banker' s problem is to choose the path of money stock 
rates of growth to maximize the expected value of its average N-period 
utility. Because of the stationary nature of the model, thls maximization 
problem reduces to a sequence of one-period problems, in which the central 
banker chooses 8t to maximize its expected one-period utility for each period 
t. If i t could adhere to a fully state-contingent rule whlle truthfully 
revealing its private information, we would obtain the ideal solution 
(7) 
This solution does provlde the desired inflation rate wi thout changing 
the average rate of output (because the predictable part of the money demand 
shock, et, is fully accommodated). 
However, Canzoneri (1985) shows that if the central banker's forecast of 
money demand is private information, direct verlfication by the wage setters 
of the central b~er' s adherence to the ideal policy is not possible. 
Therefore, if the central banker lacks this type of commitment technology, the 
discretionary solution emerges as the equilibrium outcome 
(8) • &t]o "' n• +et + ~ 
characterized an inflationary bias without a systematic higher output. 
As a consequence, canzoneri (1985) explores severa! types of resolutions 
to the inefficiency of the inflationary bias when the central banker cannot 
credibly revea! its private information. First, he centers upon a reputational 
approach along the lines -of Edward J. Green and Robert H. Porter (1984). 
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Speclfically, he shows that the existence of a trlgger strategy on the part of 
the wage setters can mltigate the time inconsistency problem partially, even 
in the presence of private information. However, this reputational solution is 
not feasible for a range of parameters such that y*/f ~ 2. 
Second, he considers a legislative approach. In particular, Congress 
could legislate a two-perlod average targeting procedure requiring that the 
average money growth rate per two periods equal the socially desired lnflation 
rate. This approach has recently been pursued by Hichelle R. Garfinkel and 
Seonghwan Oh (1993) by deriving the optimal (from Congress' vlewpoint) length 
of the average targeting horizon. Although such rules are incentive 
compatible, it will be shown below that they are too rlgid to provide a good 
resolution to the credibility problem. 
A third approach is to add private information to Rogoff's (1985) 
perverse policymaker solution. In this scenario, monetary policy is delegated 
to a fully independent central banker with an {assumed) proclivity towards 
anti-inflationary policies. Although this type of resolution works when the 
central banker's information is verifiable, Canzoneri (1985) shows that it is 
not effective when the central banker has private information concerning the 
realization of the stochastic variables that constraln its choices. Moreover, 
the same ineffectiveness applies to the delegation of monetary policy to a 
partially indepen~ent conservative central banker proposed by Susanne Lohmann 
(1992). 
A fourth approach has been suggested by Persson and Tabellini {1993). 
These authors propase that Congress should penalize the central banker through 
a linear punishment {k) for any percentage point of realized inflation. In 
this case, the central banker objective function will be 
(9) 
5 
Maxlmizlng this objective functlon, one obtalns 
(10) 8t!PT 
As a consequence, if Congress sets k = 2y*, then the ideal solution would 
be obtalned. 1 
Finally, we consider Rogoff's (1985) legislatlve approach. Congress could 
legislate a system of rewards and punishments through which the central 
banker's incentives are altered so that it places sorne direct weight on 
achieving a low rate of growth for a nominal variable that is observed by all 
market participants (e.g., the inflation rate or the money growth rate). In 
particular, Congress could legislate that a given (finite or infinite) 
punishment will be imposed on the central banker if such a nominal variable 
does not hit a prespecified target. In Rogoff's {1985) analysls, thls target 
is fixed by the central banker ltself and since his model considers a one-shot 
game, the targeting horizon is just one period. 
Here we extend Rogoff's (1985) legislative approach in two dlrections: on 
the one hand, to consider the possibility that the target to meet can be 
specified not only by the central banker, but also by Congress; and, on the 
other hand, to explore the time horizon the target must be specified far. This 
new approach will permit us to identify an optima! monetary policy package 
from Congress' viewpoint consisting of a) the optima! target, b) the optlmal 
target setter, c) the optima! punishment, and d) the optima! targeting 
horizon. 
¡ 
Although Perssai and Tabellini (1993) claim that th~ir approach is a 
targeting proceduré, lt should be clear that it cannot be considered so. The 
reason is that a targeting procedure involves a punishment for deviations from 
a prespecified target. Since in Persson and Tabellini' s analysis the central 
banker is punished for any percentage polnt of inflation, not for any 
percentage point of deviation from a target, the existence of such a target 
becomes irrelevant. In other words, their results are the same irrespective of 
a target being annoilllced or not. To my knowledge, the real world institutlons 
that would fit Persson and Tabellini's inflation contract are fixing the 
budget of the central bank or the remuneration of its governors in nominal 
terms. 
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We will center upon a money supply growth targetlng procedure because of 
two reasons. First, since the central banker cannot control the inflatlon rate 
perfectly, lt will be dlfflcult to see a central banker wllllng to be punlshed 
if lt does not hit an inflation target. Second, we will be able to compare our 
targeting approach to Canzoneri (1985) and Garfinkel and Oh's {1993) average 
targeting procedure. 
IJ. Honetary Targeting in a Hultiperiod Framework 
Assume that Congress enters legislation punishlng the central banker lf 
it fails to hit an average period money growth target, &a• over a prespeclfled 
time horizon, N. That is, the central banker chooses its policy to maximize 
(11) ~ N < O>, 
It is assumed that Congress can choose a cost h, which the central bank:er 
incurs when the target is not met on average over the targeting horlzon. The 
size of h determines the tightness of the targeting procedure. If h = 0>, 
Congress imposes an infinite cost on the central banker if the average period 
money growth target is not met. However, such a cost might be lower and it 
does not exist if h=O. 
An lmportant issue here is who specifies the target to be met. There are 
two potential candidates: Congress and the central banker. As lt wlll be shown 
below, the optima! target for Congress differs from that for the central 
banker. In this respect, our work departs from Rogoff (1985) and Canzoneri 
(1985) in that we optimally derive the target dependi~ upon the target 
setter. On the contrary, they assume that the target to be hit is the socially 
optima! inflation rate, n•. Later, we will demonstrate that such a target is 
optima! for the central banker but not for Congress. 
OUr monetary targeting model consists of four stages. 
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1) At the beglnning 
horlzon, N. 
Of period 1, Congress sets the cost, 
h, and the targeting 
2) Then, Congress ( 
••• 
or the central banker ltself) chooses 
the monetary target, 
3) Each i 
per Od from 1 to N the following 
occurs: a) the wage setters form 
their money growth expectatlons 
on the basis of their knowledge of the 
banker's utillty function, th central 
e target set ter' s identity, 
monetary target g d t the cost h, the 
' a• an he targeting h 
orlzon¡ b} the money d is r 1 · d emand shock o, 
ea ize ; c) the central banker 
sets the money growth rate. 
41 At the end of 
periOd N, the central banker is punished if the 
met on average. target is not 
In stage three th 
e wage setters. and the central banker play a non-
cooperative game which provides the 
paths of money growth rates 
growth expectations over the 
optimally chooses the monetary 
and of money 
whole N-period. 
In stage two the target setter 
target in the light of such 
stage one, paths. Finally, in Congress optimally sets 
both the punishment and the 
horizon in targeting 
order to maximize i ts expected 
average utility. As a consequence, 
the model is solved by backward induction. 
Proposi tion 1 h 
e aracterizes the equilibrium 
of the non-cooperative game in stage three. 
PROPOs!TION 1: For given h N .nd 
' ' a Ea• the paths of .IJOney growth rates 
of money growth . 
expectations are given by th ~ . 
e ollwing expressions: 
8t. == f:Nhtt* + f~g +·. [ f+(N-t)h t.-1 h 1 
. /. . • _l.''. if+(N-t+. l)h) - r;=l f(f+(N-T+l)b] y* 
+ (l_f;'f) {f+(N-t)h} 
Ct+rJl_r+cN-t}hJ + hfet. - r:--1 h(l+f) · 
"· · .. =1 (l+f)[f+(N-T)h} + hf"eT 
- r'-' h . 1 -~=t f(f+(N-T+l)h] y* 
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for t = 1, 2, .... , N. 
(see Appendix for the proof}. 
Once obtained the expressions for 8t and g:, lt is necessary to flnd the 
optima! target. Here it is important to know who sets the target because the 
central banker's utility fW"lction differs from Congress' utility fWlction 
since the former one contains the punishment for deviating from the target. 
Proposi tion 2 presents the optima! targets for both Congress and the central 
banker (g~, g:} which maximize their utility functions, evaluated at stage 
two. 
PROPOSITION 2: For given h and N, the optimal monetary targets for the 
central banker and Congress are given by the followlng expressions: 
g~ = lf* 
(see Appendix for the proof). 
f+Nh .... 
N'h Lt=1 
1 • 
f+thy 
These results suggest that strategic considerations involve the election 
of an optima! monetary target. This finding contrasts with the approach 
adopted by Rogoff and Canzoneri. In particular, we show that using the desired 
inflation rate, lf*, as a target is optima! from the central banker viewpoint 
but Congress would not choose such a target. Only if the punisment-h on the 
central banker for deviating from the target is infinlte or the targeting 
horizon is infinite, Congress would target rr*. 
Slnce. the optima! rnonetary targets for the central banker and Congress 
differ, it is clear that the paths of money growth rates will be different 
depending upon the target setter. Proposition 3 presents the existing relation 
between both paths of money growth rates. 
PROPOSITION 3: The path of money grawth is higher when the central banker 
sets the monetary target: 
9 
B 
•t 
{see Appendix for the proof), 
1 • 
f+thy 
These paths of money growth are related with those resulting from the 
average targeting solution proposed by Canzonerl (1985), and Garflnkel and Oh 
(1993), as shown in proposition 4. 
PROPOSITION 4: The average targeting resolution can be reduced to a 
special case of our approach when the punishment on the central banker far 
deviating from the target is inflnite. 
(Proof): As h approaches lnfinity, it is easy to see that both g~ and g~ 
reduce to: 
•• + 
[ 
(N-t) 
f(N t+l) yt-1 1 ]·· - "-T:t f (N-T+l) y {l+f) (N-t) t.-t 1+f [(l+f}(N-t))+f8 t. - r;;t((l+f){N T)]+f8T 
This expression is similar to that obtained by Garfinkel and Oh (1993) 
for the path of money growth rates under an average targetlng procedure. 
Moreover, our expressions for gt can be related to the discretfonary 
solution, as stated in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 5: The discretionary solution can be reduced to a special 
case of our approach when either the targeting horizon contains an lnfinite 
number of periods or the punishment h is zero. 
B C (Proof): As N approaches infinity, it is easy to see that both g~ and gt 
reduces to gtfn· At the same time, if h=O the expression for &t in proposition 
1 reduces to gtj 0 • 2 
III. Discussion 
Expressions for g~ and g~ show the existence of a gross inflationary bias 
f+(N-t)h * 
flf+(N t+l)h]y which decreases as (N-t) decreases. This implles that as time 
2 If h-0, the target &a is not determined because its existence does not 
provide any monetary discipline. 
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progresses towards N the central banker is more constralned by the target. 
Moreover, we can see that the gross inflationary bias decreases as h rlses; 
that is, the higher the punishment for not hittlng the target the more 
inflation conscious the central banker will be. 
Despite the exlstence of a gross inflationary bias, monetary targeting 
has a somewhat offsetting effect: because the target constraints monetary 
policy there must be sorne reversals of previous inflationary biases, as given 
by the t-1 term -E.;,,,1 h • f(f+(N T+1)h)Y As t approaches N, the deflationary 
reversa! is higher, so that the net inflationary bias falls and eventually 
becomes negative. This may be so despite a finite punishment h originales a 
positive average inflationary bias over the targetlng horizon (wlth the 
exception of the case where N=l). 
At the same time, the deflationary reversa! grows as h rises. Then, a 
higher punishment provokes both a lower gross inflationary bias and a higher 
deílationary reversa!. As a consequence, it reduces the net inflationary bias 
and therefore the average inflationary bias over the whole N-period. 
Moreover, g~ contains an additional inflationary term, ~ r:=t f+\hy•. The 
reason behind this additional bias is that Congress chooses the target to 
maximize i ts uti li ty function whereas the central banker maximizes its own 
utility function (which contains a punishment for deviating from the target). 
Therefore, there exists an incentive for the central banker to accommodate (to 
a certain extent) the target B 
•• Since &t contains an average 
inflationary bias (provided h < ~} the target set by the central banker will 
be higher than that set by Congress. This explains why- both targets are 
different and why monetary policy will be more inflationary if the central 
banker sets the target. 
As N rises the deflationary character of the target set by Congress is 
lessened, so that both targets are more similar. When N=l, Congress sets its 
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' y• most deflationary target (gª = n-• - h}. This target completely offsets the 
inflationary character of monetary policy, the result being that on average 
actual inflation and desired inflatlon coincide. This finding is important, 
because it implies that Congress could legislate a set of incentive compatible 
rules (a posltive punishment on the central banker, the target, and a one-
period targeting horizon) that fully eliminates the inflationary bias in 
monetary policy. 
For a given punishment h the target is less blnding to the central banker 
at any given perlad t as N grows, so that the incentive far the central banker 
to create inflation is higher at the beginning of the targeting horizon. In 
addition, the deflationary reversals must be higher at the end of the 
targeting horizon. Accordingly, the variability of the net inflation bias 
around the desired inflation rate increases as N grows. However, when N=l, 
there is no scope for flexibility in monetary policy over time so that 
Congress gains if the· target is set as to fully eliminate the inflationary 
bias. If N > 1, Congress is aware of the flexibility afforded to the central 
banker over time and, in turn, of its incentive to inflate more at the start 
of the targeting horizon (which produces variability of the actual inflation 
rate over the desired one). Hence, at the time Congress sets the target, it 
must accorrunodate to a certain extent that incentive on the part of the central 
banker in order to mitigate the variability of inflation around n•. To do so, 
as N grows Congress reduces the deflationary character of 1 ts target g; by 
approaching it to n* and provoking a positive net inflationary bias on 
average. l :§ 
The existence of monetary targeting has a cost arising from a partial 
accommodation of the current shock in money demand. The reason is that 
accommodating a shock generales a deviation between actual money growth, &t• 
and the target, &a• implying a reduction in the central banker's utility. As a 
consequence, there will be variability of both inflation and output. This 
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partial accommodation of et is given by the term (l ~\+{¡r¡;cN-t)h] e Thls 
+ + -t)h] + hf t· 
term decreases a h rises reflecting the fact that -for a given deviation 
between 8t and gª- a higher punishment decreases the central banker's utility. 
Hence, the optima! central banker' s reaction is to reduce accommodation. 
Moreover, that term raises a N-t increases, implying that the longer the 
remaining targeting horizon, the central banker will accommodate the shock to 
a higher extent because there will be more time to reverse the accornmodation 
and therefore to try to hit the target. 
The reversals of the partial accommodation of et in each of the remalning 
N-t periods are gi ven by the tenn -r:.:: h(l+f) (l+f) [f+(N-t)h] + hf -r· This term 
increases as h rises and decreases as N-t rises. 
Overall, any shock et will be accommodated -on average- to a certain 
extent over the targeting horizon, unless the punishment h is infinite. It is 
worth noting that despite the accommodation of et· in period t affects both 
inflation and output, the subsequent reversals of such accommodation in 
perlods t+l, ... ,N do not provoke variability of output because the wage 
set ter' s expectations incorporate these reversals. Nevertheless, they affect 
the variability of inflation around n•. 
IV. Expected Average Utilities 
In summary, we can find disutility arising from the targeting procedures 
due to variability of inflation and output, and due to the inflation blases. 
Congress' expected average utility if Congress itself sets the target is 
given by the following expression: 
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(12) Uc = -(y•) 2 - (l+f)u~ 
[
(1 +f) "' [ fh 
-N- Lt=t {l+f) [f+(N t)h} 
f ,JI [ f+(N-t)h t-t 
Ñ '"'i=t f[f+(N-t+l)h] - r.;=1 
• hfr-:; r:=,h::[o•f)[~~¡;~!Jh]•hf] ]·~ 
rtr+rn\+1Jhl - ~ i::'.=, r+'uf cy•J' 
Similarly, Congress' expected average utillty lf the central banker 
chooses the target to be hit is: 
(13) U8 = -(y•)2 - (l+f)u; 
[cl;r> l::'.=1[c1+ri1r+c~htlhl f t-1 h(l+f) 2 + hf - Ñ r:=):;=t (l+f)(f+(N-r)h]+hf ue ] 2 [ l] 
f <" [ f+(N-t)h _ ~t-t h ]2 (y•)2 
- Ñ '"'i=t f[f+{N-t+llhJ L..r=t f[f+{N "t"+l)h] 
It is easy to see that both (12} and (13) converge to the expected 
average utility under an average targeting procedure if h*°. Moreover, both 
expressions converge to the expected discretlonary utility if N~. 
The optima! targeting horizon and the optima! punishment that Congress 
jointly chooses in stage on"e must maximize {12) if Congress sets the target 
and {13) if the target is chosen by the central banker. 
In order to obtain the optimal -from Congress' vlewpoint- monetary pollcy 
package (consisting of punishment, horizon, target, and target setter) lt wlll 
be necessary to si~ulate the above expected average utilities since it is not 
,f 
possible to-analit1cally derive them. 
Our model presents two key parameters: a) the ratio of the weight 
attached to inflation stabillty related to output stablllty, s, to the squared 
elastlcity of output with respect to unantlcipated inf'lation, ~· this 
parameter has been denoted by f; b) the weighted difference between output 
goals in the economy relative to the predictable part of the money demand 
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1 
shock, denoted by y•/~e· 
A. Simu.lations when the central banker sets the target 
We have performed severa! simulations that are shown in table 1 when the 
central banker sets the monetary target. In each cell, the figure on the left 
shows the optima! punlshment h* whereas the figure on the rlght denotes the 
optima! length of the targeting horizon N*. For instance, the first cell in 
the table says that for f=0.1, y•;~e=0.1, the optima! combination of monetary 
policy instruments is given by h*=0.13 and N*=l. Since we have performed 
simulations up to N=lOO, the second cell in the table, for instance, is 
showing that for f=O.S, y*/~e=0.1, the optima! monetary policy combines a 
punishment h*=0.01 and a targetlng horizon consisting of N*=lOO perlods. The 
optimal combinations in the table provide a higher expected average ulility 
for Congress than the discretionary solution {h=O or N=) and the average 
targeting solution (h=i:o, N*). 
TABLE 1. OPTIMAL PUNISHMENTS AND TARGETING HORIZONS 
f 
y•/~e 0.1 0.5 1 
o. 1 0.13, 1 0.01, 100 0.01, 100 
0.5 0.45, 1 0.01, 97 0.03, 100 
1 0.79, 1 1.02, 1 0.04, 96 
Table 1 shows that, in general, for a given f, the optlmal targeting 
horizon becomes shorter and the optima! punishment becomes larger as y•/~e 
increases since in that case the benefl ts of flexibility provided by the 
targeting procedure are less worth. 
In addition, table 1 reveals that, in general, for a given y•/~e• the 
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optima! targeting horizon becomes longer and the optima! punishment becomes 
smaller as f increases. However, we can find some cases for which the optima! 
punishment rises as f grows. To explain why lt can be so, !et us consider as 
an example the case where the optima! h* grows from O. 79 to 1.02 and the 
optima! length N* is l. In this case the expected utility provided by a 
targeting procedure when the central banker sets the target is given by 
(12) 
The first terrn measures the disutillty arising from the inflatlonary bias 
whereas the second term relates to the partial accommodation of money demand 
shocks. Both terms depend positively and negatively upon the value of f, so 
that -as can be seen through their corresponding partlal derivatives- they can 
either increase or decrease as f rises depending on the values of h, y•, and 
a~. With our particular parameter values we find that the disutility from the 
inflationary term rlses and the disutility from money demand shocks decreases 
as f goes from 0.1 to 0.5. Hence, the overall utility rlses by reduclng the 
inflationary bias and by accommodating money demand shocks to a lesser degree. 
Both effects are obtained by setting a higher punishment h. 
B. Simulations when Congress sets the target 
Al! simulations performed when Congress sets the target provide a common 
result: the optima! monetary policy combines a punishment h*=0.01 and a length 
N•=t. The reason f;or this result can be observed in the expression far the 
expected so·cial ui~lity when N=1: 
(13) Uc = - (i+f) h
2 
; - {y•) 2 - (i+f)a~ 
(1+f+h) 2 
Equation (13) shows that if the targeting horizon is just one period, 
Congress sets the target in a fashion that completely removes the lnflationary 
bias in the economy. Since we are left with the dlsutility arising from the 
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r less than full accommodation of money demand shocks, it is optima! to set a 
small punishment in order to reduce such a disutility.:3 If N > 1, there will 
be an additional inflationary bias -on average- and additional variability of 
inflation around n•. Thus, a targeting horlzon longer than one perlod is not 
optima!. 
C. The Optimal Target Setter 
Once obtained the optima! values of h and N for the two possible 
scenarios, we must decide between them in order to maximize expected Congress' 
utility. Table 2 presents the utility differences exlsting between the optima! 
monetary policy when Congress sets the target {h•=0.01, N*=1) and the optima! 
monetary policy when the central banker sets the target (as given in table 1). 
TABLE 2. EXPECTED AVERAGE UTILITY DIFFERENCES 
f 
y•/ae 0.1 0.5 
0.1 0.28% 0.66% 0.70% 
0.5 0.05% 0.03% 0.05% 
0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 
For instance, the flrst cell in the table shows that the disutllity 
generated by the optima! monetary policy when the target is set by Congress is 
just 0.28%· of the same disutility when the target is set by the central 
banker. 
Our results suggest that an improved Rogoff's (1985) flexible approach to 
3 It is clear that expression (13) is maximized lf h:Q. However, as noted 
above, if there is no punishment on the central banker for deviatlons from the 
target, the discretionary solution will emerge. Hence, only if h > O we would 
obtain expression (13). 
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monetary targeting (in terms of optimizing not only the punishment h but also 
both the length of the targeting horizon and the identl ty of the target 
setter) provides a better resolution to the time inconsistency problem that 
the average targeting approach of Canzoneri {1985) and Garfinkel and Oh (1993) 
in presence of private information on the part of the central banker. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
This paper studies the efficacy of monetary targeting to mi tigate the 
classic time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy if the monetary 
authority's forecast of money demand is private information. In particular, we 
have analyzed the effects of a legislated monetary pollcy package consisting 
of a monetary target, a punishment far deviation from the target, a targeting 
horizon, and a target setter. Our results show that the best package should 
lnclude a target set by Congress, a targeting horlzon consistlng of just one 
period. of time and a small punishment on the central banker if it deviates 
from the target. 
The analysis might be extended to include persistence of the central 
banker's private information and the possibillty that the central banker could 
revea!, at least partially, its private information by making use of noisy 
announcements as in Garfinkel and Oh (1990) or Jeremy C. Stein (1989). 
Another lnteresting task for future research is the choice of an optima! 
monetary targeting package in a multisector economy, along the lines of 
Christopher J. Wal!ler (1992). 
);{ 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF OF PROPDSITION 1: 
In perlad t = N, the central banker maximizes the following program 
The eXpectation of the first-order condition, conditlonal on eH• provides 
the central banker' s decision rule as a functlon of the target, g..,,, the wage 
setter's action, g:. and previous period.'s money growth, r::~ &t: 
(A2l g, - l+f+h [g: + y• + rn• - h[~:: g, - Ng.J + (l+fle•] 
Assurnlng rational expectations on the part of the wage setters when 
setting g;, we obtain 
(AJ) h ["'-' l 1 +f 
- f+h i..t.=1 &t - Ng..,, + 1+f+h H 
In period t = N-1, the central banker salves the problem: 
Substituting Sn and g: into (A4) and taking into account that EN_1(5H)=O, 
the expectation of the first-order condition, conditional on eH-t• provides: 
(AS) gH-1 
--
1
-,- [g;_l + y• + ;:hlt* - ~h[~=~ 8t - Nga]- + {l+f)eN-ll 
1+f+hf+h 
Using g;_1, money growth in t=N-1 is 
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(A6) 
In perlod t = N-2, the central bank:er solves: 
Substituting gN, 
conditlonal on eN-2:• provides: 
(AS) 8N-2 
and • 8N-1• 
expectation of 
and 
the 
Using g;_2, money growth in t=N-2 is given by: 
taklng in ta account that 
flrst-order condition, 
(A9) gH-2 = f :3h n• + --'-r:---:y• - f ~h [ ~=: gt - Ngª] + __ l+_f---:r:--•,n-2 
f+hf+2h 1+f+hf+2h 
Repeating this seqoence of maximizatlon programs far periods t=N-µ, the 
general solution far money stock growth is given by: 
(A10) 8N-µ 
- "•·] + --'~+_r __ _,, f N-J.L 
l+f+hf+µh 
farµ= 1,2, ... ,N-~. 
Using µ=N-t, -~e have the following expression for money growth in period t 
(A11) gt 
far t 1,2, ... ,N. 
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Now, we have to elimlnate past g'r so as to express optima! monetary 
policy in terms of current et and past eT, the parameters of the model, and 
the target &a· To do so we make use of (All) to flnd g
1 
· and sequentially 
When t=l, we have 
_ f • + Nh f+(N-l)h • (l+f)[f+(N-l)h] (AlZ) &t - f+Nhn f+Nhgª + f[f+NhJ y + (l+f)[f+(N-l)h] + hfel 
Substituting (A12) into g2, we obtain 
f[f+(N l)h] - f[f+Nh) y + {l+f) [f+(N 2)h] + hfe2 
h(l+f) 
(l+f)[f+(N l)h] + hfel 
[ 
f+(N-2)h h ] • (l+f)[f+(N-2)h] 
Substituting (A12) and (A13) into g3 , we obtain 
_ f • Nh [ f+(N-3)h _ h h ] (At 4 l &3 - f+Nhn + f+Nhgª + f{f+(N 2)h] f[f+(N-l)h] - f[f+Nh] y* 
(1+f)[f+(N-3)h] h(l+f) h(l+f) 
+ {1+f}[f+(N-3)h] + hfe3 - (l+f)[f+(N-2)h) + hre2 - 7('1+"f~)~[~f~++(N~-~1ri)~h"]-+"'h~f"'e1 
Repeating this sequence of substitutions until period N, one can verify 
that the general solution is the expression given in the text, Moreover, {All) 
shows that, at time t, past money disturbances, e~, are fully revealed to the 
wage setters upon their observing past g~, 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
The central banker chooses the target, g!. to maximize 
{AlS) 
subject to the expressions for &t and g: in proposition 1. The expectation of 
the first-order condition, taking into account that Eo<Ot)=O, is the 
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following: 
(A16) 
(Al?) 
,Ji [ Nh Nh B [ f+(N-t)h 
"-t=t - f+Nhn• + f+Nhgª + f(f+(N-t+l)h] <-l h ] l - r;=1 f[f+(N T+l)h] y• 
[ 
Nf , 
- f+Nhlr 
Nf e ,JI [ f+(N-t)h 
- f+Nhgª + l..t.=1 f[f+(N-t+1)h] <-l h ] ] - E.;=1 f[f+{N T+l)h) y• =O 
Rearranging, we obtain the optima! target for the central bank, g! = n* 
Congress chooses the target, g=, to maximize 
subject to the expressions for gt and g~ in proposition 1. The expectation of 
the first-order condition is: 
It is easy to see that the following equality holds: 
(Al 9 ) r:: [ f+(N-t)h t-t h ] , _ ,JI 1 • l=1 f[f+(N t+l)h) - r;=1 f[f+(N-T+l)h] y - Lt.::01 f+thy 
Rearranging (A18) and using (A19), we obtain the -expression for g~ in 
proposition 2. 
PR!XIF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
Substituting g: n• in to the expression for gt in proposi tion 1 one 
obtains the following 
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B _ • + [ f+(N-t)h (Al9 ) &t - n f[f+(N t+l)h} 
t-1 h(l+f) 
- r;=t {l+f)(f+(N T)h] + bf8T 
\t-1 h ] • (1+f)[f+(N-t)h] 
- '1:"'1 r lr +CN--i-+1 }hl Y + T(ie1+.irC;¡rit'<r'i+i;[Nó:'it;J,ch;'I "'•"-h~r"'º' 
Similarly, substituting the expression for g~ into 8t we obtain 
' 1 l::'. 1 (AZO) g = n* - - --y• + 
t N =t f+th 
(l+f) [f+(N-t)hJ t-t + - ,.. (l+f) [f+(N-t)h] + hf t '1:=t 
so that proposition 3 holds. 
[ 
f+(N-t)h t-t 
f[f+(N-t+l)hJ - r;=t 
h(l+f) 
(1+f)(f+(N-T)h]+hf8T 
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h ] • f(f+(N T+l)h) y 
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